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APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

of

this

Court

is conferred

provisions of §78-2a-3 (2) (i) Utah Code Ann.

pursuant

(Supp. 1993)

to

the
This

action involves the appeal of certain provisions of Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce signed and entered
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah on April 29, 1993.
filed on May 26, 1993.

A timely Notice of Appeal was

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Copies of the following are found in Addendum A to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(5)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mrs. Mary Coelho, the plaintiff-appellant in this case, filed
a complaint against her husband, Alcides J. Coelho, the defendantrespondent,
parties'
equitable

seeking

minor

children,

division

attorney's fees.

a decree

of

of divorce, sole

alimony,

the

real

child
and

custody

of

the

fair

and

property,

and

support,

personal

a

The case was tried before the Honorable David S.

Young for two and one-half hours on February 11, 1993.
Each side was represented by counsel and presented documentary
evidence.

Mrs. Coelho testified, but Mr. Coelho's testimony was

proffered by his counsel due to the time constraints imposed by the
court.

In

addition,

Mr.

Coelho

presented

testimony

of

two

witnesses, both of whom had provided tax and accounting services on
his behalf.
After brief closing arguments, the trial court ruled from the
bench. Defendant's counsel submitted Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce on April 9, 1993.

Plaintiff's counsel

filed her Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce on April 19, 1993.

On April 29, 1993, after

defendant's counsel submitted his Reply to Objections, the court
entered its Minute Entry denying the objections and entering the
2

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce that had
been submitted by defendant's counsel.

Plaintiff's Notice of

Appeal was filed on May 26, 1993.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiff/appellant, Mrs. Mary Coelho (hereinafter Mrs.
Coelho

or

wife),

and

defendant/respondent,

Alcides

J.

Coelho

(hereinafter Mr. Coelho or husband) , were married on July 16, 1977.
(Tr.p. 59 line 18)

Three children were born as issue of this

marriage, Sara, now 15 years of age, born August 7, 1978; Tony, now
13 years of age, born August 19, 1980; and Emily, now 7 years of
age, born September 29, 1986. (R. 2, 13) At the trial, the parties
stipulated that the two youngest children would remain in Mrs.
Coelho7s custody, and that the oldest child would remain in the
custody of Mr. Coelho. (Tr.p. 4, lines 7-9)

The parties stipulated

to liberal visitation for each of them with the child or children
not in their physical custody. (Tr.p. 4-5)
The parties' middle child, Tony, is handicapped and has been
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD),

(Tr.p. 61, line

6), with hyperactivity and multiple learning disabilities.
61 line 7)

(Tr.p.

Tony requires substantial personal time, attention and

care from Mrs. Coelho (Tr.p. 61 lines 11-18; Tr. p.66 lines 20-25;
Tr.p. 67, lines 1-25; Tr.p. 68, lines 1-25), and receives regular
psychological therapy and medication. (Tr. p.63, lines 9-25; Tr.p.
64, lines 1-15)
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After the parties married, Mrs. Coelho did not complete her
college education as an art major. (Tr.p. 71 lines 19-21; line 23)
She held various jobs, in addition to being a full-time homemaker
and mother.

(Tr.p. 73, lines 5-13)

Dver the course

of

the

marriage, she worked as a real estate agent during the 1980's
(Tr.p. 74, lines 16-17), as a ski repairer (Tr.p. 73, line 8 ) , and
as a bookkeeper for Mr. Coelho's business. (Tr.p. 73, lines 12-13)
At the time of trial, Mrs. Coelho was a full-time pre-nursing
student. (Tr.p. 81, lines 3-4)

She was also working fifty hours

per week at two jobs, one as a ski instructor (seasonal) (Tr.p. 80,
line 23), and the other as a trainer in a center for handicapped
adults.

(Tr.p. 80, line 23)

Plaintiff's gross monthly combined

earnings from the two jobs were approximately $1,329. (Tr.p. 80-83,
Exhibits 12, 13)
Mr. Coelho is a contractor and ran his own business, Coelho
Construction Company, during most of the marriage.

(R-341)

His

earnings during the last three years of the parties' marriage,
before

deductions

expenses,

were

for

$69,032

necessary
in

1990

and

discretionary

(Exhibit

(Exhibit 10); and $95,346 in 1992.

9 ) ; $76,954

(Exhibit 21)

business
in

1991

Mr. Coelho's

business expenses, as shown on the tax returns (Exhibits 8, 9, 10) ,
included deductions for depreciation, use of personal residence as
an office, telephone charges, and entertainment.

At the time of

trial, Mr. Coelho was still self-employed, but proffered that his

4

projected income for 1993 would be less than his 1992 net schedule
"C" income of $95,346. (Tr.p. 124, line 24)
At the time the Plaintiff filed for divorce, the parties owned
a home, a 1984 Toyota 4-Runner, a 1983 Toyota Landcruiser, a 1976
Ford truck, two (2) horses and tack, a horse trailer, various items
of

household

businesses

furniture

known

Development.

as

and

furnishings,

Solamere

(R. 4-7)

and

Partnership

The home had

interests

in

and

Classic

New

two

an agreed upon value of

approximately $300,000 (Tr.p. 3 ) ; a first mortgage against it of
approximately

$140,000

(Tr.p.

12);

and

a

second

mortgage

obligation, a line of credit, which had a balance of approximately
$34,000 at the time of trial. (Tr.p. 12)
Prior to the trial, Mr. Coelho moved the court to allow him to
use this line of credit to pay his temporary support obligations
(R. 115-116), and in its Minute Entry on December 16, 1992, the
court granted the motion, reserving the issue of whether Mr. Coelho
would be required to repay the amounts used until time of trial.
(R. 273)
of

the

At the trial, Mrs. Coelho proffered that at least $7,000
line-of-credit

was

incurred

by Mr. Coelho

to pay

his

temporary support obligations during the last few months of 1992.
(Tr.p. 13)
Mrs. Coelho testified that her earnings as a real estate agent
had fluctuated greatly and that in the one year in which she had
substantial earnings from sales, 1985, it was due to the fact that
she had

received

a very

large commission

5

on the sale of one

property. (Tr.p. 75, lines 15-20)

The commission was paid to Mrs.

Coelho over three years, with her receiving the largest portion in
one year and $10,000 a year for the following two years.

(Tr. p.

75,

dropped

lines

23-24)

In

subsequent

years, her

earnings

dramatically, and the increasing needs cf the children demanded
that she spend more and more time at home attending to their needs.
(Tr.p. 76; lines 4-10)
net

earnings,

Mrs. Coelho also testified that her average

including

extra

amounts

earned

during

the

busy

Christmas ski season, were $1,121.54 per month (Exhibit 15), and
that her monthly expenses, for herself and two of the parties'
three children, were $3,560.00. (Exhibit 14) Mrs. Coelho testified
that she had a monthly shortfall, between the amount of income she
could generate through her own efforts and the expenses for herself
and the two children, of $2,438.46. (Tr.p. 85, line 11)
Plaintiff's counsel offered evidence at trial regarding the
availability of construction work in both Park City and Summit
County (Tr.p. 10, lines 10-25; Tr.p. 11, lines 1-4) to establish
that there was ample work available in the area and to substantiate
her claim that Mr. Coelho was voluntarily underemployed.

Defendant

objected on the basis of relevancy, and the court excluded this
evidence from its determinations. (Tr. 93, lines 11-12)
At

trial,

Mr.

Coelho

did

not

testify,

but

his

counsel

proffered his testimony to the court, including Mr. Coelho's claim
that, while 1992 was a very good year

<Tr.p. 125, line 4) , he

believed he would not make as much in 1993.
6

Mrs. Coelho's counsel

was not allowed to cross-examine Mr. Coelho regarding his testimony
because of the time limitations imposed by the court.

However,

Mrs. Coelho took the position that the court should find that Mr.
Coelho's monthly income averaged over the years 1989 through 1992
was $6,500.

Mr. Coehlo's counsel proffered at trial that his

living expenses were $3,490 per month. (Exhibit 25)
At the conclusion of the proffer, the trial court asked the
parties to waive closing arguments or, in the alternative, return
the following day for that purpose.
counsel
proceed.

had minimal

time

to argue

Because of other commitments,
the evidence

but

chose

to

The trial court asked counsel to suggest approximate

levels of support that should be awarded, and advised counsel for
the plaintiff

that

it would not take the

time

to review

the

documentary evidence she submitted at trial. (Tr.p. 128, lines 1325)
The

trial

court, ruling

from the bench,

found

that Mrs.

Coelho's income was the amount of $1,500 per month (Tr.p. 138, line
25), and that Mr. Coelho's income was $5,000 per month.
136, line 24)

(Tr.p.

The court, in its ruling:

(a) awarded

child

$619.00 per month;

support

to Mrs. Coelho

in the amount

of

(Tr.p. 139, lines 1-2)

(b) ordered the parties to share the costs in Tony's therapy
proportionately, with Mrs. Coelho to pay 3 0% and Mr. Coelho to pay
70% of said costs; (Tr.p. 139, lines 20-24)
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(c) awarded alimony to Mrs. Coelho in the amount of $1,000 per
month, for a period of one year, (Tr.p. 13.9, line 6) , at which time
she

could

petition

the

court

for

a

reevaluation

to

determine

whether alimony should be terminated at that time or extended based
upon the circumstances then existing;

(Tr.p. 139, lines

6-10)

(d) ordered Mrs. Coelho to pay one-half of any tax liability
owed by the parties for the 1992 tax year (Tr.p. 141; lines 18-23) ,
despite the fact that the parties had lived apart since October 7,
1991;

(R. 30)
(e) ordered that Mrs. Coelho's one-half of the net proceeds

resulting from the sale of the home be reduced by one-half of the
total amount of the equity line mortgage, despite the fact that Mr.
Coelho

had

used

a

substantial

portion

of

it

to

satisfy

temporary support obligations; (Tr.p. 141, lines 1-17)

his

and

(f) awarded Mrs. Coelho the sum of $3,000 for her attorney's
fees

and

costs

incurred

in

the

action

(Tr.p.

140,

lines 5 - 7 ) ,

despite her claim for fees in excess of $10,000;
The

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law,

and

Decree

of

Divorce, prepared by Mr. Coelho's counsel were, over the objection
of Mrs. Coelho's counsel, were signed and entered by the court on
April 29, 1993.

(A copy of each is included in Addendum B to this

Brief.)
Mrs. Coelho filed her Notice of Appeal on May 26, 1993.
361-62)
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(R.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

It was an abuse of discretion to arbitrarily restrict the

time allowed for Mrs. Coelho to present her case, without prior
notice or opportunity to prepare for such restrictions.
2.

It was prejudicial error for the court to allow Mr.

Coelho's testimony to be proffered, thereby denying Mrs. Coelho's
counsel the right to cross-examine him, and it was also prejudicial
error to refuse to review the documentary evidence submitted by
Plaintiff at trial.
3.

It was prejudicial

availability

of

construction

error to exclude evidence of the
in Park

City

and

Summit

County,

thereby affecting the substantial rights of Mrs. Coelho.
4.

The court's findings as to the parties' gross incomes

were clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence, and the
award of financial support based on those finds was inadequate and
an abuse of the court's discretion.
5.

It was an abuse of the court's discretion to award Mrs.

Coelho an inadequate alimony sum of $1,000 per month, and to limit
the award

to a period of one year, in light of Mr. Coelho's

historical ability to pay alimony, Mrs. Coelho's monthly needs, her
ability to provide for her own needs, the parties' established
standard of living during the marriage, and the length of the
parties' marriage (16 years).
6.

It was an abuse of the court's discretion to order Mrs.

Coelho to pay from her share of the net proceeds resulting from the
9

sale of the parties' home one-half of the equity line mortgage, a
substantial portion of which was incurred oy Mr. Coelho to meet his
temporary support obligations.
7.

It was an abuse of the court's discretion to order Mrs.

Coelho to pay one-half of the parties' tax obligation for 1992,
when the parties had been separated since October of 1991, and Mr.
Coelho's ability to pay the debt greatly exceeded Mrs. Coelho's
ability.
8.

It was an abuse of the court's discretion to order Mrs.

Coelho to pay 3 0% of the therapy expenses for the parties' son,
Tony, in light of the disparity in the parties' incomes.
9.

It was an abuse of the court's discretion to award Mrs.

Coelho only the inadequate sum of $3,000 in attorney's fees, when
her total fees exceeded $10,000, and there was no evidence offered
at trial to dispute the reasonableness of the fees or Mr. Coelho's
ability to pay attorney's fees.
POINT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SUBSTANTIALLY
RESTRICTING THE TIME ALLOWED FOR TRIAL, WITHOUT NOTICE TO
THE
PARTIES,
THEREBY
DENYING
FLAINTIFF
ADEQUATE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER CASE AND CROSS-EXAMINE
DEFENDANT.
Inherent in the right to access to the courts, as outlined in
Article I §§ 7 and 11 of the Constitution of Utah, a party is
entitled to present its case to the trial court.

In this case,

however, the Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to do so. Due to
the court's admonitions to counsel as to the limited time available
10

for trial - - a total of little more than two (2) hours -- Plaintiff
was prohibited from calling witnesses she had intended to call; she
was hurried in her testimony; and she was unable to cross-examine
the Defendant.
The parties were scheduled and prepared for a full day of
trial.

Instead, when they arrived, the court advised counsel that

they would have until noon to present their case because the judge
had a meeting.

The transcript of the trial, which is only 145

pages long, indicates that the hearing began at 9:20 that morning.
The first 58 pages of the transcript record the discussions between
the court and counsel regarding the stipulated
issues

remaining

for

trial.

The

court's

issues and the

time

restrictions

concerned counsel for both parties, and they expressed this concern
at trial.

Presentation

of

evidence began

transcript when Mrs. Coelho took the stand.

on page

59 of the

Mr. Coelho's counsel,

concerned about the time allocated between the parties, inquired of
the court:
Mr. Dart:

So that we are measuring our [time] like high
school debaters are we going to go to 12:00 or
12:05?

Judge Young:

I am supposed to be in Salt Lake at 12:00,
which I obviously won't make, so I will let
you have til 12:00 o'clock.

Over the remaining pages of the transcript, the court and
counsel made several references to the time:

11

a)

The court stated that certain issues could be dealt with

by proffer, and it did not "need to hear testimony about them."
(Tr.p.52, lines 4-7)
b)

The judge admonished Mrs. Coelho's counsel that he was

"concerned about the allocation of time," and that he did not know
"whether [the testimony being offered]

[was really going to help

[the court]." (Tr.p.78, lines 6-8)
c)
the

Mr. Coelho's counsel expressed concern about the time and

court

notified

Mrs. Coelho's

counsel

that

she was

"about

through" and further stated that he " [didn't] know why some of this
[testimony] could not be stipulated to without laboriously going
through this [testimony]." (Tr.p. 86, lines 16-22)
d)

The judge told counsel that "[he] did have a problem on

time. I'm sorry that I have that, but the Chief Justice called a
meeting." (Tr.p. 86, lines 22-23)
e)

After Mr. Coelho's counsel had cross-examined one of his

witnesses,

the

court

asked

him

to

advise

it

as

to

what

he

"anticipated in [his] last witness in terns of testimony." (Tr. p.
123, lines 25; p. 124, line 1)
f)

The court stated, at the close of the evidence, that it

"[had] a couple of options," and asked counsel if they wanted to
"waive argument" or "come back for about a half an hour argument"
on the following morning. (Tr.p. 127, lines 23-25)
g)
obviously,

The

judge stated that

is pressure

on

time,
12

"the problem
and

that

[he] [needed]

[he]
to

[had] ,

both

be

sensitive to [their] opportunities to be adequately heard and also
to the pressures that
judicial council."

[he had]

in terms of commitment

to the

(Tr. p. 136, lines 4-8)

The bottom line is that Mrs. Coelho expected a full day of
trial and had subpoenaed witnesses to appear on her behalf.

When

the court advised counsel that they had less than two hours to try
the case, she had only enough time to testify as to very basic
information

and

no

opportunity

to

corroborate

that

testimony

through her scheduled witnesses. The time restrictions, imposed by
the court without prior notice to the parties, were arbitrary and
prejudicial to Mrs. Coelho.
Mr. Coelho will contend that the trial court "cured" its haste
when, it its Minute Entry dated April 29, 1993, it invited the
parties

to

file

their

motions

for

a

new

trial

if

the

time

constraints remained "a concern." (R. 330-331).
In light of the hurried nature of the trial itself, Mrs.
Coehlo did not believe that she would gain any benefit by filing a
motion

for a new trial

and did

not pursue

that

course.

In

addition, with more than $7,000 in attorney's fees and costs that
the court ordered her to bear, it was economically prohibitive for
her to consider further proceedings in the lower court.

This

decision was not unreasonable.
The court also denied Mrs. Coelho adequate access to the court
when

it asked Mr. Coelho's

thereby

prohibiting

Mrs.

counsel

Coelho

13

to proffer his

from

testimony,

cross-examining

him

and

affording no opportunity for the court to judge the credibility of
his testimony.

Taking such evidence by proffer is a violation of

Rule 43, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides:
(a) Form.
In all trials, the testimony of witnesses
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise
provided by these rules, the Utah RuLes of Evidence, or
a statute of this state
All evidence shall be admitted
which is admissible under the Utah Riles of Evidence or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret the
provisions of Rule 43 as it is applied to motions in the case of
Stan Katz Real Estate Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1977).
The court stated:
We recognize that Rule 43 (e) allows the District Court to
grant or deny a motion on the sole or combined bases of
affidavits, depositions or oral testimony. However, when
no depositions have been taken and disputed material
facts are alleged in opposing affidavits, there should be
an evidentiary hearing to aid in the resolution of those
facts. The reasons for requiring an evidentiary hearing
under the circumstances were enunciated in Autera v.
Robinson, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 216, 419 F.2d 1197, 1202
(1969), as follows:
'Had no factual dispute arisen to plague the parties'
substantive rights' we would perceive no difficulty in
the judge's acceptance as a predicate for his action, of
the facts represented through statements by members of
the bar and affidavits of the parties or others. In this
case, however, despite the factual questions developing
as the hearing moved along, no opportunity was afforded
anyone to test any representation by the chastening
process of cross-examination . . . The opportunity to
judge credibility was non-existent as to the absent
affiant; the opportunity to probe by cross-examination
was completely lacking. Without those twin tools, normal
in the trial of factual issues, the factual conclusion
was certain to take on an unaccustomed quality of
artificiality . . . we recognize, of course, that trial
judges have a discretion to hear and determine ordinary
14

motions either on affidavits or oral testimony portraying
facts not appearing of record. We note, however, that an
attempted resolution of factual disputes on conflicting
affidavits alone may pose the question whether the
discretion was properly exercised.'
565 P. 2d at 1143.

(Although the Utah Supreme Court cited Rule

43(e) and not 43 (b) , the court quoted the provisions of 43(e) in
footnote no. 2, and it is identical to the current language of Rule
43(b) .)
The portion of Rule 43 at issue in the Katz case relating to
receiving oral testimony in support of motions is discretionary.
By contrast, the provision applicable to this case, subsection (a) ,
is mandatory.

At trial, therefore, it is even more important to

afford a party the opportunity to test the representations made by
"the chastening process of cross-examination" and allow the trial
court an opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by
hearing oral testimony.

By allowing Mr. Coelho to proffer his

testimony, the trial court in this case denied Mrs. Coelho the
opportunity for cross-examination and denied itself the opportunity
to judge Mr. Coelho's testimony.

Therefore, on disputed issues of

fact, the court's findings and conclusions, in the words of the
Supreme

Court,

take

on

a

"quality

of

artificiality"

which

substantially affected Mrs. Coelho's rights in this action.
This case should be remanded to the trial court for a new
trial, consistent with the requirements of Rule 43, and allowing
Mrs. Coelho adequate time to present her case.
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POINT II
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING RELEVANT
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF AND BY ITS REFUSAL TO
REVIEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
One of the primary issues before the court was whether Mr.
Coelho's
income.

1993 income would be considerably

less than his 1992

Mr. Coelho took the position that his 1993 income would be

substantially less than his 19 92 income due to factors beyond his
control, but Mrs. Coelho argued that he was simply "posturing" in
anticipation of trial.

To establish that Mr. Coelho was in fact

capable of earning at or in excess of his historical level, Mrs.
Coelho attempted to introduce certain evidence at trial that would
substantiate the building activity that had been occurring in both
Park City and Summit County.

This evidence included summaries of

records of building permits recently issued in Park City and Summit
County.

Mr. Coelho objected on the basis of relevance, and the

court sustained the objection and stated:
Judge Young:

Well, I can't even begin to believe that
I would be making a decision on the basis
of the building permits that are offered
in Park City. There are so many variables
as to whether those building permits are
comparable, whether he could do that kind
of work, whether he is the one that solely
gets a building permit. There are just too
many variables for me to make a decision on
that basis.

Ms. Saunders:

Okay. My only point in showing it,
irrespective of how the court rules, and
this is for the record, it is to show if
Mr. Coelho claims there is no work available
in Summit County or Park City that there is
certainly a great amount of activity that
goes on, and whether he qualified under it
16

or not there's still work there.
(Tr.p. 92, lines 16 through p. 93, line 5)
It

was

relevance.

error

to

exclude

this

evidence

on

the

basis

of

Pursuant to Rule 4 01 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

"relevant evidence" is defined as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable then it
would be without the evidence.

The issue of whether or not Mr.

Coelho was voluntarily underemployed was of serious consequence to
Mrs. Coelho as it affected the financial support awarded by the
court and the allocation of debt.

Given the fact that Mr. Coelho

was in the construction business, evidence that work was available
made it more probable that he was voluntarily unemployed.

It was

therefore relevant and its exclusion was prejudicial error.
In addition, the offer of the evidence was in the nature of a
request for the court to take judicial notice of public records.
Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it is the duty
of the court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

Under

that rule, "a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate

and

ready

determination

by

resort

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."

to

sources

whose

It is mandatory for the

court to take judicial notice "if requested by a party and supplied
with the necessary information."
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The documents that Mrs. Coelho's counsel wanted to admit were
public records and therefore their accuracy could not reasonably be
questioned.

Because

of

Mr.

Coelho's

unavailable, the evidence was relevant.

claim

that

work

was

The weight the court

desired to give to that evidence was within its discretion, but
refusing

to admit

subsequently

it was prejudicial

error because

accepted Mr. Coelho's proffer

the

court

as to earnings

and

speculated that his income for 1993 would oe less than 1992. There
was no basis, either in the transcript or the record, on which to
justify such speculation.

In contrast, the evidence offered would

have contradicted Mr. Coelho's position that he was underemployed
because there was no work available.
In addition to the court's failure to admit relevant evidence,
the

court

admitted.

expressly

refused

to review

evidence

that

had

been

Mrs. Coelho's counsel offered copies of the parties' tax

returns and other financial documentation which were admitted into
evidence. (See Exhibits 2 through 10 and Exhibit 16)

At the close

of Mr. Coelho's case, his counsel advised the court that he would
agree to waive closing argument if Mrs. Coelho's counsel would as
well.

Her counsel indicated that she would do so because she

thought the "paper work," referring to the tax returns and other
exhibits she had submitted, would "help [the court] out," and the
court responded:
Well, I'm prepared to rule right now. I don't
think you can expect that I am going to go through
the backup documents and the checks and the tax
returns and the other documents.
18

(Tr.p. 128, lines 13-16)
It is the duty of the court to listen to the testimony of
witnesses, to review the documentary evidence admitted, and to
render a decision after its consideration of all of the evidence
and testimony adduced at trial.

Any other procedure, even in the

interests of time, is arbitrary, without support in fact or law,
and an abuse of discretion.

The findings relating to Mr. Coelho's

income are not supported by the evidence, and this case should be
remanded for a new trial and an adequate consideration of the
evidence.
POINT III
THE COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTIES' GROSS
MONTHLY INCOMES TO THE PLAINTIFF WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND RESULTED IN AN
INADEQUATE AWARD OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT
Despite the fact that the uncontroverted evidence at trial
established

that

Mrs.

Coehlo's

monthly

net

income

averaged

$1,121.54 and her monthly expenses were $3,560.00, and despite the
fact that, since 1989, Mr. Coehlo's earnings averaged $6,597.92 per
month, the court only awarded Mrs. Coehlo alimony in the amount of
$1,000 per month for one year and child support in the amount of
$619 per month.

The court's findings as to the income of the

parties, the awards of child support and alimony are as follows:
8.
Income Determination.
The
court
heard
testimony from plaintiff concerning her income history
and capacity to earn income, testimony from two
accountants concerning the parties' historical income and
defendant's income for 1992, a proffer concerning
defendant's current earning capacity, and copies of the
parties' tax returns for the past ten years together with
19

summaries. The court having reviewed and considered all
the evidence, finds that based upon the current
circumstances defendant has an earning capacity of $5,000
per month and plaintiff has an earning capacity of $1,500
per month, and the court's findings related to support
and alimony are based upon these income expectancies.
Specifically, the court finds that defendant is
a small independent contractor who has had good years and
bad years. It appears that 1992 was a good year but the
income related primarily to one project, and it further
appears that defendant earned most of the 1992 income
during the first part of the year, with very little
income for the last part of the year and with no income
for the first month of 1993.
It is because of these
circumstances that the court finds the expectancy for
1993 of defendant's income is the amount of $5,000 per
month.
Specifically, the court finds that plaintiff is
currently working at employment as a ski instructor and
working with disabled children, earning an income
substantially below what she has historically earned when
she was active as a real estate person during the 1985,
1986, 1987 and 1988 years, as reflected in plaintiff's
own Exhibit 11. It is anticipated that plaintiff should
be able to become more gainfully employed and after a
short period of time earn an income sufficient to meet
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability.
9.
Child Support.
Consistent with the Child
Support Guidelines of the State of Utah, the income
determinations set forth in paragraph 8, and the custody
arrangement between the parties as sec forth in paragraph
4 above, defendant should pay to plaintiff as child
support the sum of $619 per month, commencing with the
month of February, 1993, as shown on the Child Support
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A" . As a further
obligation of support, defendant should be responsible to
maintain the children on his currently-held health and
accident insurance which has a $500 deductible and each
of the parties should be responsible for one-half of all
non-insured medical expenses incurred by any of the three
children.
Defendant should have the further obligation to
pay to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which
she incurs which are work related
Plaintiff shall
provide to defendant an accounting at the end of the
month of the time and cost of child care.
Defendant
20

should then pay to plaintiff one-half of S C J
within ten days of receipt of the accounting.
The court finds that Tony is currently in need
of therapy, and to the extent that expenses are incurred
for necessary therapy as that necessity is indicated by
his therapist, the cost of this therapy should be paid
70% by defendant and 30% by plaintiff. This proration is
roughly equatable to the proration of income between the
parties and, further, takes into consideration the fact
that
plaintiff
should
have
some
substantial
responsibility for the cost of therapy as she has control
of determining how often therapy is received.
The parties have stipulated that Sara should be
seen by a mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of
once a month and in the event of any opinion of the
therapist that more therapy is required, then as often as
necessary, with each of the parties to be responsible for
one-half of the therapy.
The choice of a mutuallyacceptable therapist for Sara should be determined by the
parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein.
Any
therapy for Sara with Michelle Miller should be paid by
defendant. The division of this cost equally between the
parties is different than the division related to Tony's
therapy for the reason that defendant
shall be
responsible for all of the costs of Michelle Miller, who
is the current therapist for Sara.
Any obligation for payment of support or
medical or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the
children are minors and thereafter to high school
graduation for any child who turns 18 prior to
graduation.
11, Alimony.
Based upon the findings which the
court has previously set forth above and based upon the
living expenses of the parties as set forth in their
respective exhibits, defendant should pay to plaintiff as
alimony the sum of $1,000 a month commencing with the
month of February, 1993, and continuing for a period of
one year to allow plaintiff
the opportunity to
reestablish her income based upon her demonstrated
historical earning capacity.
At that time, plaintiff
should have the right to petition the court for a
reevaluation to determine whether alimony should be
terminated at that time or extended based upon the
circumstances then existing.
(R.I : • 3 1:0 3 1 4)

. "
2 :i

These findings are clearly erroneoas because they are not
supported by the evidence at trial.
to

the

Plaintiff,

based

on

these

The financial support awarded
findings,

was

an

abuse

of

discretion.
A. Financial Circumstances
The evidence at trial established that Mrs. Coelho was working
two jobs, one as a ski instructor which was seasonal and another as
a trainer working with handicapped adults. In addition, she was
also attending school full-time. Her average net monthly income was
$1,121.54. Mrs. Coelho also testified that she had worked as a real
estate

agent

commission
averaged

and

from

that
one

during

sale.

approximately

1985 she had made
Excluding

that

$25,000 per year

of

a very

large

Mrs.

Coelho

income

(after

year,
net

necessary business expenses) from her real estate earnings which
included

a $10,000 annual payment

deferred from the very same sale.

for two

(2) years that

was

From 1989 through 1991, her net

income from real estate earnings averaged less than $3,000 per
year, and she did not work in real estate after 1991.

She also

testified that she was no longer licensed as a real estate agent,
and estimated that it would take her the average length of time,
about five years, to build up a clientele.

She also testified that

the parties' handicapped son, Tony, demanded much of her time and
attention, thereby making a reentry into tne real estate profession
impractical.

In fact, the court had previously awarded Mr. Coelho

$2,600 per month as combined temporary support.
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(R. 43-51)
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t he

amount.

The evidence supporting Mrs. Coelho's position included

the parties' tax returns and evidence of Mr. Coelho's historical
earnings was undisputed at trial. Despite the undisputed evidence,
however, the court chose to arbitrarily set Mr. Coelho's income at
the speculative amount of $5,000, based only on the proffer of his
counsel.

The court's determinations were clearly erroneous, not

based on law or fact, and unsupported by the evidence.

Because of

their adverse impact on both the child support and alimony amounts
awarded to Mrs. Coelho, the findings should be vacated and this
case remanded to the trial court for a determination of appropriate
findings on which to base an adequate award of child support and
alimony.
B. Child Support
Under Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5(5) (Supp. 1993), the trial
courts

are

required

to verify

calculate child support.

the

incomes

of

the parties

to

In pertinent part, this section states:

(b)
Each
parent
shall
provide
suitable
documentation of current earnings, including yearto-date pay stubs or employer statements.
Each
parent shall supplement documentation of current
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least
the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall dccument income from
nonearned sources according to the source.

(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used
to determine whether an underemployment or over
employment situation exists.
(Emphasis added.)
This section clearly requires the court to base its award of
support

on

the

current

earnings
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of

the parties.
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determination

of

the

C. Alimony
The same error that skewed the child support calculations also
adversely
Coelho.

affected

the amount

of the

alimony

awarded

to Mrs.

Based on the court's analysis of the incomes of the

parties, and its speculation as to her future earnings, it only
awarded Mrs. Coelho alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for
a period of one year.

This was clearly an abuse of the court's

discretion and not based on the evidence adduced at trial.
The factors the court should have considered when making an
award of alimony are well-settled in Utah law.

In awarding alimony

the court was required to consider:
1.

The financial condition and needs of the
party seeking alimony;

2.

That party's ability to produce sufficient
income for him or herself; and

3.

The ability of the other party to provide support.

See Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah App. 1990); Naranio v.
Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Watson v.
Watson, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (1992).
This court has also held that the " [f]ailure to analyze the
parties'

circumstances

in

the

light

constitutes an abuse of discretion."

cf

these

three

factors

Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P. 2d

at 1147 (Utah App. 1988).
Applying

these

factors to the

case on appeal, the

court

clearly abused its discretion in fashioning a support award for
Mrs. Coelho.

First of all, evidence at trial established that Mrs.

Coelho's monthly living expenses were $3,560.00
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(see Exhibit 14)
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in

In its f i n d i n g s the court

stated:
The court finds that [Mrs. Coelho] is c u r r e n t l y
w o r k i n g at e m p l o y m e n t as a [ski] i n s t r u c t o r and

working with disabled children, earning an income
substantially below what she has historically
earned when she was active as a real estate sales
person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 years,
as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11. It is
anticipated that [Mrs. Coelho] should be able to
become more gainfully employed and after a short
period of time earn an income sufficient to meet
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability.
(Finding No. 8; R.340; emphasis added)
Even in the court's own finding, it acknowledges that
Mrs. Coelho's real estate earning history ended in 1988, five years
before the trial.

Therefore, it was error for the court to even

consider it in determining Mrs. Coelho's ability to provide for her
own financial needs.

However, even if she did have the ability to

earn income at the court's level of $1,50 3 per month, it is clear
that she cannot maintain herself and the children in the standard
of living to which the family became accustomed during the marriage
without an appropriate amount of alimony in excess of that awarded
by the court.
Finally, the court must consider the ability of the defendant,
Mr. Coelho, to pay alimony.
respects.

In this regard, the court erred in two

First of all, the court erred in disregarding his actual

earnings to reach its determination that his average monthly income
was $5,000.

Instead, evidence at trial established that he had net

earnings of $95,346 in 1992.
Coehlo's

The only evidence at trial as to Mr.

future earnings was the proffer made by Mr. Coehlo's

counsel that he "expected" to earn no more than $60,000

in 1993.

Again, by accepting this proffer despite substantial evidence to
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into the future to reduce his average earnings.

At the same time,

the court put Mrs. Coelho a^~ =* disadvantage by using income figures
11 t:i fi c i a 11 y

;;:

increase her expected

earnings.
Second,

the court erred hv -iccertir. : Mr. '"'oehlo's month] y

li v :i i ig expenses

as listed

.:: a u

_xnii:i: 25.

expenses are excessive almost as a matter of law.

Several

of his

Unfortunately,

Mrs . Coelho' a counsel was not given the time to « la : o s s exan a i ie I Ii:
Coelho
($400.00

about
-.he p r o f e s s i o n a l

entertainm^r*

pense

the

furniture

services

expense

replacement
($500.00),

expense
and his

($400 00 ) , : :i : if: : 22 : : 'SS exan i:i 1: ie 1 :i :i t 1: 1 a s to

whether many of those expenses, e.g., automobile, health insurance,
and entertainment, were paid by his business before he received his
in-1 < \~u'n 1 n q s

"Tl ie t a x reti irns

returns, would so indicate.
counsel

had been cautioned

a n d spec,] f i cal ly Schedul e C of the

Throughout the trial Mrs. Coelho's
to be brief, to hurry

through

her

c ] i e 1:11:' s c a s e , a 1 1 d 1 1 e 1 :i 1: 1 a b :i ] i t: \, t o c 2: o s s e: : a m :i 1: 1 e I I :i : C • :: e ] 1 1 :: • a: a s
exception, as is illustrated by the following exchange that took
place between the court and counsel:
Ms. Saunders: And the other thing I didn't get
to talk to Mr. Coelho about and I would have
asked on cross-examination is why, why for one
man [are] his monthly expenses $3,900 a month
and my client's [are] $400.00 less a month and
she had the three children, the mortgage
payment and herself to support.
That's
outrageous. I mean, if he is paying $4,000 a
month for one person, for himself, that's a

,;: 9

high standard of living when thiee children, a
house and a mother are less.
Mr. Dart:
I can [respond] to everything
that's been said if the court's interested in
hearing it.
Judge Young:
Yes, but the problem I have,
obviously, is pressure on time, and I need to
both be sensitive to your opportunities to be
adequately heard and also to the pressures
that I have in terms of commitment to the
judicial council.
It is clear that Mr. Coelho's expenses, particularly when
compared to his wife's expenses for herself and two children, were
excessive and not representative of his actual expenses.

Instead,

it is clear from the evidence at trial that Mr. Coelho had the
ability to pay alimony in an amount that would provide Mrs. Coelho
and the children a standard of living comparable to his own.

Under

these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to award Mrs.
Coehlo alimony of only $1,000.00 per month.
Finally,

the

court

clearly

erred

as

a matter

of

law

by

limiting the award of alimony to a period of one year.

The parties

were married

is of long

for sixteen years.

Where a marriage

duration and the earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds
that of the other, an alimony award is made to insure that the
supported spouse may maintain a standard of living that would have
been enjoyed had the marriage continued.

(See Naranio, at 1147;

See also Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah App. 1988) .
There are neither such findings in this case nor any evidence which
would support such findings.

Clearly, Mrs. Coelho will be unable
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1

* I L J U M I I t.li

t I irTiii-j enjoyed dining the marriage with

standard

the inadequate and limited alimony awarded by the trial court.
The parties' historical abilities and present abilities

to

eai i ] :i i icoi i: Le vi ei s significai 11:] y and substantially disparate.
evidence of M r s . Coelho's needs was undisputed.
she

could

not

meet

suppoi t f i om I Ir

those

Coell 10 .

needs

without

The

It was clear that

substantia]

f i nanc

i ail

Finally, it was clear from the evidence

that Mr. Coelho had an ability to provide sufficient support.
Based on the evidence in the record

tl :i :i , 3 • ::oi 1:1 : t , sh : 1 LI I re^ ^erse

the lower court's award of alimony and enter :i ts own order awarding
Mrs.

Coelho

alimony,

retroactive

to the date

of

trial,

:r

~he

amount she requested of $2 , 5 0 0 p e 1 1 noi 11h (T1 : , p , 2 ] , ] :i 1 1 es
which

should

continue

until

whichever shall first occur.

she

remarries,

cohabits,

01

:i:--s,

In the alternative, the case should

lit-"* n'MTiandpd f 1 > 1 1111 ippropr i ate d^t prm i r 1 • 11 i'Mii 11I alnnuij/.
POINT I J
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING PLAINTIFF
TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE TOTAL EQUITY LINE MORTGAGE
AND ONE-HALF OF THE TAX OBLIGATION OWING TO THE IRS
11: 1 t:he Decree of D:i vo 1: ::• E
one-half

t:he cc 1 11 t Drdered M1 s . Coe1 11 o to pay

of the total equity line second mortgage owing on

the

p a r t i e s ' residence in the amount of $34,400, despite the fact that
appro x i m a t e .1 } r $ 7 0 0 0 • :: • f 1 1 1 • a b a 1 a n c e o w i 1 1 g w a s u s e d 1: •} i
pay his temporary support obligations.

• :

•to

Finally, the court ordered

M r s . Coehlo to pay one-half of the parties' tax obligation to the
IRS

: 1 1 11 1 e bas:i s 11: 1 a t

t:I: 1 e y

1 1 a d bot: 1 1 de 1 i « ed a benefit

from the

money during the marriage, despite the fact that the parties had
not lived together during the entire year. Mr. Coehlo's ability to
pay that tax was substantially better than Mrs. Coehlo's, and his
income comprised a much greater percentage of the whole income upon
which taxes were due.
The findings in support of the court's decisions state, in
pertinent part, as follows:
5.
Real Property.
The house and real
property located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park
City, Utah, should be listed for sale with a
real estate agent mutually acceptable to the
parties, and a listing price to be arrived at
between the parties in consultation with said
real estate agent.
Upon the sale of said
house and real property, and after payment of
the first mortgage obligation to Valley
National Mortgage Co. which has a current
balance of $137,000, the second mortgage lineof-credit to Valley Bank which [has] a current
balance of $34,400, expenses of sale and any
out-of-pocket
expenses
of
either
party
necessary to place the home in marketable
condition,
and
any
moving
expenses
of
plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any
remaining equity should be divided equally
between the parties....

7. Debts and Obligations. The liabilities of
the parties should be assumed and paid as
follows:
(a) The first and second mortgages
on the home at 5328 Old Ranch Road,
Park City, should be assumed and
paid as set forth in Paragraph 5
above.

(b) The 1992 income tax liability
of the parties should be divided
equally between the parties, and the
32

p a r t i e s should cooperate w i t h their
accountant,
E.J. Passey,
in the
p r e p a r a t i o n of income tax returns
e i t h e r jointly or separately w h i c h
w i l l p r o v i d e the lowest total tax
liability.
Defendant should be
responsible for and p a y for the cost
of this tax preparation.
(i-1 , -\Ah ~34U>)
W h i l e the trial court is given b r o a d discretion to a l l o c a t e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for marital debt between the p ai rties, (see S i n c l a i r
v.

Sinclair,

. ••

•.. .Jet.

d i s c r e t i o n i:: this case,

::e court

abused

its

' :: -.r about O c t o b e r 15, 1991, the court

entered its temporary ~rder vwa^-i" :"i
!

in the a m o u n t ^f $2,6CG per m o n t n .

v

' ~- :. ) "fan

R. i ••

si lpp <: i : t"

A p p r o x i m a t e l y one y e a r

l a t e r , o n or about N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 1992. the D e f e n d a n t m a d e a m o t i o n
t o b e a I ] < ~ •A- - •

•-

this s u p p o r t w ^ i i g a t i o n ,

•"

•' •

r t g a g e t: : s a t i s f y

..- b a s i s for his m o t i o n

was

his c l a i m that he had finished the c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s u p o n w h i c h
t h ^ 1 rTnporaiy

M M I I I »\M

u n t i l the s p r i n g .

- I i nl

MIM

nun ii'ipat* I having in

employment

(R 11 7-119)

M r s . C o e l h o o b j e c t e d , citing her a r g u m e n t that: M r , C o e l h o w a s
v o ] i i n t: a r :i ] y

a i I • :i

:i n t e n t i o n a 1 ] y

\ 11 i d e i: e i n p 1 o y e d .

T:

31,1 p p o 1 t

p o s i t i o n , she r e l i e d on the tax r e t u r n s of the p a r t i e s , a m o u n t s in
M r . C o e l h o ' s b a n k a c c o u n t s , his h i s t o r i c a l e m p l o y m e n t h i s t o r y , w o r k
availabl e ,i n Park

r

M + "

,M

I 1L

"UIUPI

had r e c e n t l y t a k e n out of s t a t e .

(I

ai; I "int 1 11^ I t ipj, Mi ,
12 9-139)

jelho

The court g r a n t e d

the m o t i o n , r e s e r v i n g the issue of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to p a y b a c k the
a m o 1.1 n is s :i 1: 1 c 1; 11: 1: e :I 1 11: 11: :i ] t :i 1 1: 1 e
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:> £ t: 1 i a ] (1 1

2 ; 3 a n d. 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 ) .

her

After ruling on the primary issues on the date of trial, the
court asked counsel if there were "anything else unresolved," (T.
14 0,

1.

25)

and

counsel

and

the

court

subsequently

had

the

following exchange:
Ms. Saunders: The second mortgage, the line
of credit, we had not discussed.
Judge Young: That's considered by the court
to be a marital [debt] and that's considered
to be the joint responsibility of the parties.
So what'11 happen is that'll simply be paid
off out of the proceeds of the sale of the
home.
Ms. Saunders:

What if the house isn't sold?

Judge Young:
Then it remains as an expense
against the mortgage. Against the property.
It is a marital expense. In other words, they
can resolve how they are going to deal with
that marital expense, but it is a joint
marital expense and it goes against the asset
value.
Ms. Saunders: Even it part of it was used
to pay the alimony?
Judge Young:
It was used to pay
because of the loss of income.

alimony

Mr. Dart:
Finally, there is an issue, I
suppose, at least I've heard it, that the 1992
tax liability, whatever it is, is going to be
for $15,000.00, $20,000.00. Our position is
it is marital and should be divided.
Judge Young: It is a marital expense and it
should be divided.
(T. 141, lines 1-25)
The court was required to make specific findings to support
its determination allocating these obligations equally between the
parties.

In neither the transcript of the trial nor the findings
34

s u b s e q u e n t 1 / ^ u t e i ^ d I , I L>

ui " i > I h e r e a n y s p e c i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n

a s to w h y the court r u l e d as it did.

I n s t e a d , the c o u r t s i m p l y and

a r b i t r a r i l y c o n c l u d e d that the c r e d i t l i n e e x p e n s e a n d ~:~

* = •• •'--; -

wei e i i: iai: i t:a 1 e x p e i ises.
Based

:>i I 1 lis p r o f f e r

at

trial

and

submitted to the court, M r . Coelho clearly

based
1MS

HI*

on

the

evidence

IIPHI'PT

RbLin. /

to p a y the credit line expense and tax debt.
To b e g i n first with the credit line e x p e n s e , M r . Coelho should
have b e e n required *

"

i

. ..

weight of evidence e s t a b l i s h e d that he was intentionally u n e m p l o y e d
in anticipation of trial.

Clearly, a i nan who averaged $6,500 per

m o n t h s :i n c e 1 9 8 9 i i D i :i ] d i l • : t: 1: e t: o t a ] ] \ \ \ :i t: 1 i ::> i 1 1 ; \,i D r ] : : i £ i 11 I d s t: : i i: i e
his o b l i g a t i o n s .

At the v e r y least, the court should have accepted

evidence on this issue.

instructions a^ \^ the appropriate division :^r chis debt after a
determination

as

to

whether

Mr.

Coelho

was

voluntary

and

i n t e n t i o n a 1 ] y i 11 i d a i : e mp 1 o y e d
Second, the court abused its discretion by ordering each party
to p a y one half of the 1992 tax debt.
Fal ]

: f 1 9 911 a .i l :i 1 :i

?

The p a r t i e s separated in the

E I a ipai : t: :ii n : i i l g

I::l: le entire

19 92 tax year .

Contrary to the general p r e m i s e that b o t h p a r t i e s b e n e f i t t e d from
the

monies

not

paid

for

taxes, Mrs.

temporary suppoi: t ai i: ic I 11 11: I" I:i :

Coelho

received

only

the

C• : e ] 1 i :: ; * as Di: dered to p a y during the

entire y e a r . T h e r e f o r e , regardless of w h e t h e r M r . Coelho paid his
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taxes or whether he used the money for other expenditures, Mrs.
Coelho did not benefit from that decision,

The court's ruling, in

fact, penalized her, making her responsible where she had no input
in the decision not to pay taxes and where that money had been
available only to Mr. Coelho to meet his obligations.
Instead, the evidence is clear that Mr. Coelho had the much
greater financial ability to pay the taxes and at the very least
the court should have apportioned responsibility for the debt based
on

each

party's

proportionate

share

of

the

income

earned.

Splitting responsibility for the debt was an abuse of discretion
and Mr. Coelho should be ordered by this court to pay in full the
IRS obligation or at least the greater proportionate share of it.
POINT V
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ONLY AWARDING MRS.
COELHO $3,000 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IN FAILING TO MAKE
THE REQUISITE FINDINGS UPON WHICH TO BASE AN AWARD.
Trial

courts have

the power to award

attorney's

fees

divorce proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3
1993).

in

(Supp.

While the decision to make an award and the amount of the

award are within the sound discretion of the trial court, an award
of attorney's fees must be based upon the need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the paying spouse to pay such fees and the
reasonableness of the fees.

An award of attorney's fees must be

supported by adequate findings. As outlined in the case of Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1991):
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A trial court has the power to award attorney's fees in
d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g s , pursuant to U t a h Code A n n . § 3 0-3-3
(198 9) . The award must be based u p o n evidence of the
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of
the o t h e r spouse to pay, and the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the
r e q u e s t e d fees. The decision to make such an award and
the amount
thereof
rests p r i m a r i l y
in the
sound
d i s c r e t i o n of the trial court.
A court m a y consider,
among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation,
the e f f i c i e n c y of the attorneys, the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of
the number of hours spent on the case, the fees
c u s t o m a r i l y charged in the locality, the amount involved
in the case and the result obtained, and the expertise
and experience of the attorneys involved.
id

,il

I'M '.

In the Bell case, the Plaintiff p r e s e n t e d evidence that
reasonable attorney' s fees were $2,350 , a nd the Defendant
challenge the reasonableness of the fees.

her

:i :i • :i i ic -t

Even so, the trial court

awarded the plaintiff only $800 and made no findings relating
the three factors or any explanation f^r .-unfiling
the r e q u e s t e d
court

fees.

Thi s court

for a redetermination

support

iw-ii'l

Haumont,

remanded

Fin ,II 'I'Mii'i, t 1! i

793 P.2d 421

ai' / ' iif t hj.rd '<f

the case to the

of attorney's

to

fees

and

trial

findings

to

I M-li'"'i| i'ii Haumont

tULali App. 1990)

in which this court

v,

held

that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to award less
than

t• h P amowrit" o f a 1 1 o r n e y ' a f : ^ e s < • I a Lin*•• •;' i absei 11: a i easoi iable

justification.

(See 810 P.2d at 494)

These p r i n c i p l e s

are directly applicable

to the

attorney's

fees awa rde d t: 1 Ie i: • 1 a i nt: :i f f :i i I t: 1 i :i s :: as e

\ \ t: 1 1 l e

counsel

relating

for

the

Plaintiff

proffered

testimony

1: :i i t: le o f t r i a 1,
to

the

attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff as well as submitting an
a f f i da v i t

(S e e

I ] a i i I t: :i f f

i E x h i b., i 1
37

19 )

T :> ] :;»e g i n w i t h,

t he

parties stipulated that the fees charged by the Plaintiff's prior
attorney, Mary Corporon, in the amount of $946.57 were reasonable.
(Tr.p. 90 lines 11-15)

After that stipulation was submitted to the

court, Evelyn Saunders testified that her fees, which she believed
were reasonable, totalled $9,164, not including amounts incurred on
the date of trial.

(Tr.p. 90, line 21 through p. 92 and line 6;

Plaintiff's Exhibit 19)
Despite
despite

the

the
fact

fact

that

that

the

this

evidence

defendant

did

was uncontested
not

object

to

and
the

reasonableness of the fees or deny his ability to pay, the trial
court simply ruled "now, as to attorney's fees, he is to pay $3,000
of her attorney's fees and otherwise each is to bear their own."
(Tr.p. 140, lines 5-7)

The only finding which supports this award

is finding number 13.

It states:

13.
Attorney's
Fees and
Costs.
Plaintiff
proffered evidence of attorney's fees which she had
incurred with her prior attorney Mary Corporon and with
her present attorney Evelyn R. Saunders and the court
having considered the reasonableness of the fees and the
relative ability of the parties to meet the cost of
attorney's fees and taking into consideration that the
Defendant shall be responsible for all of his own fees,
finds that it is reasonable that Defendant should be
responsible for payment of $3,000 to Plaintiff for her
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action, which
amount should be paid within 12 0 days from the 11th day
of February, 1993 or upon sale of the house and real
property of the parties, whichever occurs first.
This

finding

is

insufficient

outlined by this court.

to

satisfy

the

requirements

Specifically, the trial court failed to

make a finding as to the Plaintiff's need for payment of her fees
and the Defendant's ability to pay those fees. As argued above, the
38

incomes of the parties' incomes were greatly disparate, and the
only justification for reducing the attorney's fees from the amount
requested was the statement that the Defendant would be responsible
for all of his own attorney's fees.

However, the court made

absolutely no finding nor is there any evidence in the record as to
the Defendant's fees and costs incurred in this matter.
Because the amount and reasonableness of the fees claimed by
Mrs.

Coelho were undisputed and because there was no evidence

before the court which would support any reasonable justification
for the court's decision to award Mrs. Coelho less than all of her
fees claimed, the award of attorney's fees and costs to Mrs. Coelho
clearly was an abuse of discretion.

This case should be remanded

to the trial court with instructions to make findings with respect
to Mrs. Coelho's

financial

need

for her attorney's

fees, Mr.

Coelho's ability to pay her fees, and the reasonableness of the
fees incurred.

In addition, if Mrs. Coelho is awarded less than

her undisputed claim for fees, additional findings must be made as
to a reasonable justification for that award.
CONCLUSION
The court's arbitrary imposition of time limits prevented Mrs.
Coelho from having her day in court.

As a consequence, relevant

evidence was excluded and the court's summary consideration of the
evidence admitted resulted in findings that are clearly erroneous.
Based

on

those

findings,

the

court

abused

its

discretion

in

fashioning alimony and child support awards, in allocating debt and
39

in awarding attorneys fees.

Where the evidence is clear, this

court should simply enter its own orders consistent with the actual
circumstances of the parties at the time of trial.
remaining
Coelho

As to the

issues, this case should be remanded to afford Mrs.

the

opportunity

to

fully present

her

case

and

for

appropriate determination of the facts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \2J^

day of November, 1993.

GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above
and

foregoing

BRIEF
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duly

hand
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DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

DATED this

I^

day of November, 1993
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ADDENDUM A

30-3-1

30-3-1.

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Procedure — Residence — Ground

s.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

fore, no fault need be proven to apply Sub^r
tion (3)(h). Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P 2 d ^ i "
M 421
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Irreconcilable differences.
Jurisdiction, district courts.
I r r e c o n c i l a b l e differences.
Because Subsection (3)(h) does not set forth a
specific fault of the defendant, in contrast to
the other subsections, it can be inferred t h a t
Subsection (3)(h), unlike the other provisions,
is intended to be a no-fault provision. There-

Jurisdiction, district courts.
When purported marriage is void ab initio
under * 30-1-2, a trial court lacks subject ma
ter jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree Van
1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Y o u n g L a w R e v i e w . — No-Fault
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79.
A.L.R. — Insanity as defense to divorce or
separation suit — post-1950 cases, 67
A.L.R.4th 277.

Divorce and separation: effect of court order
prohibiting sale or transfer of property on
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance
policy, 68 A.L.R.4th 929.

30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.

ANALYSIS

attorney fees.
— Need.
Determination.
Attorney fees for appeal.
Discretion of trial court.
A t t o r n e y fees.
In accord with last paragra
ume. See Morgan v. Morga.
Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Attorney fees may be awan
he support and maintenance
jluding actions for the mod:
justody. The decision to awa
within the trial court's discret
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utai
Either party to a divorce a
dered to pay the adverse part
lefend the action. This incluc
.ncurred on appeal. Maughan
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 198
In order to award attorne
•ourt must find the requesting
inancial assistance and th>
guested are reasonable. Rich
P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 19:
Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utal
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.l
\ p p . 1990); Walters v. Waltt
Utah Ct. App. 1991).

(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support
and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the
other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order
or judgment.

— Need.
Trial court did not abuse its
iering each party to pay his o
ney fees, where neither party
i i e ability to pay the other
r
ees. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.L
\ p p . 1990).
Wife who did not prevail on .
-he brought on appeal and d
financial need on the record w
nev fees on appeal. Haumont \
? 2 d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 199
An award of attorney fees n
evidence of the financial need
-pouse, the ability of the othe
and the reasonableness of the
Rellv. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utal
Since the trial court, in aw
ees. did not address the reaso

H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 30-3-3, e n a c t e d b y L.
1993, c h . 137, § 1.
R e p e a l s a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1993,
ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to order

A.L.R. — Death of obligor <•
mg alimony, 79 A.L.R.4th 10

either party to pay for the separate support
and maintenance of the adverse party and the
children, and enacts the present section, effective May 3, 1993.
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78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer
statements and income tax returns.
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JUDICIAL CODE

(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a

parent, the income shall be based" for "Income
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Modification of award
Cited.
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred
in modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the

support amount without finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred
since the previous order had been entered.
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders).
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IH AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY COELHO,
MINUTE ENTRY
RULING 4-501 UCJA

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALCIDES J. COELHO,
Defendant.

CASE # 91-11093

The C o u r t h a s r e v i e w e d t h e O b j e c t i o n s of t h e plaintiff a n d t h e Reply of t h e
Defendant.

The C o u r t d e n i e s t h e O b j e c t i o n s a n d a p p r o v e s a n d e n t e r s t h i s d a t e

t h e F i n d i n g s a n d Decree a s s u b m i t t e d .
F u r t h e r t h e C o u r t s t a t e s t h a t within t h e plaintiff's O b j e c t i o n s t h e r e is
l a n g u a g e e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n as to t h e "limited time" allowed for t h e h e a r i n g .

The

D e f e n d a n t ' s r e s p o n s e in p a r t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e O b j e c t i o n s of t h e Plaintiff a r e
d e s i g n e d , in p a r t , to i n c r e a s e t h e " v u l n e r a b i l i t y " of t h e C o u r t ' s decision on
a p p e a l . The Court s t a t e s t h a t it too felt c o n c e r n a s to t h e "time" a v a i l a b l e for
t r i a l . The day h a p p e n e d to be a day on which t h e Chief J u s t i c e called a s p e c i a l
meeting of t h e J u d i c i a l Council of which t h e u n d e r s i g n e d is a member. As it
t u r n e d out, I was one a n d one-half h o u r s late for t h e meeting.
In o r d e r to c o n s i d e r t h e m a g n i t u d e of t h e c o n c e r n , t h e C o u r t i n v i t e s a
Motion for a New Trial to be filed a n d a r g u e d if t h a t r e m a i n s a c o n c e r n .

The c o u r t

n o t e s t h a t t h e r e was no timely objection to t h e p r o c e d u r e on t h e day of t h e t r i a l
b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s x^ould like to c o n s i d e r t h e p r e s e n t c o n c e r n s of t h e p a r t i e s a s to
t h e a d e q u a c y of t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n s .

Neither p a r t y should p r e s u m e a s to t h e

C o u r t ' s p r e s e n t view in c o n s i d e r i n a a New Trial. The p r e s e n t c o n c e r n of t h e C o u r t

B_1

oormn

^ k ,

is to determine if either party believes they did not have a adequate opportunity
to p r e s e n t their case and each should state what they vzould request, if anything,
to be f u r t h e r presented to the court.
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No.

FILED

B. L. DART (818)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Defendant
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383

AP* 29 1993
Qerk V Sv-nmi> County

fc...
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
MARY COELHO,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
ALCIDES J. COELHO,

Case No. 11093

Defendant.

Judge Young
oooOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on Thursday, the 11th day of February, 1993, at the hour of 9:00
a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Evelyn R.
Saunders, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney
B. L. Dart, and plaintiff having testified and two accountants
having testified and defendant's testimony having been proffered
and other matters were submitted by proffer and the Court having
received exhibits and the matter having been submitted and the
Court being fully advised, hereby makes the following:

B-3
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'IS

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in Park City,

Utah on the 16th day of July, 1977, and since that time have been
husband and wife.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant are both residents of

Summit County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three
months immediately prior to the filing of this action for
divorce.
3.

Grounds.

Differences have arisen between the

parties which have made it impossible for them to continue with
this marriage relationship.

The parties have been separated

since October, 1991, and the Court finds that grounds exist for
entry of a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
4.

Custody and Visitation.

born as issue of this marriage:

Three children have been

Sara, born August 1,

1978, who

is 14 years of age; Tony, born August 19, 1980, who is 12 years
of age; and Emily, born September 29, 1986, who is six years of
age.

Pursuant to stipulation of the parties and consistent with

the child custody evaluation filed in this action, plaintiff
should be awarded the care, custody and control of Emily and
Tony, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation,
which should be as follows:

2
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a.

The right to have these two younger children,

each Monday evening from 5:00 p.m. to 8 p.m. for CCD and so long
as they are attending CCD.
b.

The right to have the two younger children

each Wednesday evening from 5:00 p.m. until Thursday morning and
then take them to school.
c.

The right to have the two younger children

each Saturday evening from 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
d.

The right to have all three children each

Christmas Day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
e.

All other major holidays to be alternated

between the parties.
f.

During the summer school vacation period, the

visitation schedule should change to alternating weekends and be
adjusted so that all three children are together each weekend.
g.

The right to be informed of and attend all

school activities, school performance and any extracurricular
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have
input into the important educational decisions of the children,
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the
right to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48
hours.
h.

Such other visitation upon which the parties

can mutually agree.
3
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Custody of Sara should be awarded to defendant
subject to plaintiff reasonable and liberal rights of visitation
as follows:
a.

The right to have Sara Thursday evenings at

6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.
b.

The right to have Sara each Christmas Eve

from 5:00 p.m. to Christmas Day at 9:00 a.m.
c.

Major holidays to be alternated between the

d.

Alternating weekends during the summer school

parties.

vacation period to coordinate with the two younger children so
that all three children are together each weekend.
e.

The right to be informed of and attend all

school activities, school performance and any extracurricular
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have
input into the important educational decisions of the children,
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and to
be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the right
to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48 hours.
f.

Such other visitation upon which the parties

can mutually agree.
5.

Real Property.

The house and real property

located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, Utah, should be listed
for sale with a real estate agent mutually acceptable to the
4
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parties, and a listing price to be arrived at between the parties
in consultation with said real estate agent.

Upon the sale of

said house and real property, and after payment of the first
mortgage obligation to Valley National Mortgage Co. which has a
current balance of $137,000, the second mortgage line-of-credit
to Valley Bank which have a current balance of $34,400, expenses
of sale and any out-of-pocket expenses of either party necessary
to place the home in marketable condition, and any moving
expenses of plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any remaining
equity should be divided equally between the parties.

An

exception to out-of-pocket expenses would be that any painting
paid for by defendant should be without reimbursement up to the
amount of $1,200.
a.

Plaintiff should have an option for 3 0 days

from the 11th day of February, 1993, to retain said house and
real property upon payment to defendant of his equity in the
property which payment should be made within 3 0 days from the
time of the exercise of the option.

Defendant's equity should be

established as one-half of the remaining amount after deducting
the first and second mortgage obligations from the sum of
$300,000, the appraised value of said house and real property.
Plaintiff's option should be an exclusion from the listing of
this property so that in the exercise of this option, no real
estate commission will be incurred.

5
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Plaintiff should have the further option of
having the right of first refusal in the event of an offer by a
third party on the home upon the same terms as said third-party
offer so long as the amount received by defendant for his equity
is no less than the amount he would have received if a third
party offer had been accepted.
b.

Until such time as said house and real

property has been sold, plaintiff should have the right of
exclusive occupancy and should be responsible for payment of the
first mortgage obligation.

The second mortgage obligation should

be paid one-half by each of the parties, and in the event that
either party pays more than one-half, then that party is entitled
to reimbursement of such excess of the other party's share at the
time of the sale of said house and real property.
c.

Each party should be ordered to cooperate in

any way necessary to expedite and facilitate the sale of said
house and real property as the proceeds from the sale constitute
the only major asset of the parties and these proceeds will be
necessary to meet various liabilities of the parties for which no
other funds are immediately available.
d.

Plaintiff has requested that any occupancy of

the house not occur until after the end of the 1991-1992 school
year.

While the Court finds that it is in the best interests of

the children that they be allowed to stay in this home through

the school year, the Court feels that if a sale of the home would
6
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be lost by placing this as a condition of sale, that the need of
the parties to sell this home should take priority and preempt
any concerns which may exist for the children remaining in the
home for the duration of the school year.
6.

Personal Property.

The personal property of the

parties should be awarded as follows, with the award to either
party to be free of any claim of the other:
a.

Each of the parties should be awarded any

items of furniture and furnishings and personal possessions
currently in his or her own possession except as otherwise
expressly hereinafter provided.
b.

Each of the parties should make available to

the other party any photographs for the purpose of allowing the
other party to reproduce the photographs at his or her own
expense or to keep duplicate photographs.
c.

Defendant should be awarded his personal

property currently located in the home occupied by plaintiff.
d.

Defendant should be awarded his equipment and

personal property stored in the garage and under the tarp on the
property currently occupied by plaintiff.
e.

Plaintiff should be awarded the smaller

Fraughton statuary and the larger Fraughton statuary should be
placed in the hands of an art dealer on consignment for sale and
with any net proceeds of sale to be divided between the parties.

7
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Defendant should be awarded the 1984 Toyota
4-runner.
Plaintiff should be awarded the 1983 Toyota
Landcruiser.
Plaintiff should be awarded the horse
trailer.
Plaintiff should be awarded the 1976 Ford
truck.
Plaintiff should be awarded her horses and
tack.
k.

Plaintiff should be awarded the use of the

snowblower so long as she resides in the Park City area, but it
should be returned to defendant upon plaintiff moving from the
Park City area.

Defendant should have the right to use the

snowblower to clear construction sites so long as his use does
not interfere with plaintiff's need.
1.

Defendant is awarded his stock in Coelho

Construction Company together with any liabilities.
m.

Plaintiff is awarded her premarital Kodak

n.

Plaintiff is awarded rhe Blue Cross/Blue

stock.

Shield health insurance premium refund and defendant should
provide whatever cooperation he can in obtaining a new
replacement check.

B-10
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o.

Defendant is awarded the stock in New Classic

Development together with any liabilities.
p.

Defendant is awarded the parties1 interest in

Solamere Partnership, together with any liabilities.
7.

Debts and obligations.

The liabilities of the

parties should be assumed and paid as follows:
a.

The first and second mortgages on the home at

5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, should be assumed and paid as set
forth in paragraph 5 above.
b.

The 1992 income tax liability of the parties

should be divided equally between the parties, and the parties
should cooperate with their accountant, E. J. Passey, in the
preparation of income tax returns either jointly or separately
which will provide the lowest total tax liability.

Defendant

should be responsible for and pay for the cost of this tax
preparation.
c.

Defendant should be responsible for any

liabilities in connection with Coelho Construction Company, New
Classic Development and Solamere Partnership.
d.

Each party should be responsible for the

payment of any liabilities which he or she has individually
incurred since the separation of the parties in October, 1991.
8.

Income Determination.

The Court heard testimony

from plaintiff concerning her income history and capacity to earn

income, testimony from two accountants concerning the parties1
9
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historical income and defendant's income for 1992, a proffer
concerning defendant's current earning capacity, and copies of
the parties' tax returns for the past ten years together with
summaries.

The Court having reviewed and considered all the

evidence, finds that based upon the current circumstances
defendant has an earning capacity of $5,000 per month and
plaintiff has an earning capacity of $1,500 per month, and the
Court's findings related to child support and alimony are based
upon these income expectancies.
Specifically, the Court finds that defendant
is a small independent contractor who has had good years and bad
years.

It appears that 1992 was a good year bat the income

related primarily to one project, and it further appears that
defendant earned most of the 1992 income during the first part of
the year, with very little income for the last part of the year
and with no income for the first month of 1993.

It is because of

these circumstances that the Court finds the expectancy for 1993
of defendant's income is the amount of $5,000 per month.
Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff
is currently working at employment as a ski instructor and
working with disabled children, earning an income substantially
below what she has historically earned when she was active as a
real estate sales person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988
years, as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11.

It is

anticipated that plaintiff should be able to become more
10
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gainfully employed and after a short period of time earn an
income sufficient to meet her own needs based upon her
demonstrated ability.
9.

Child Support.

Consistent with the Child Support

Guidelines of the State of Utah, the income determinations set
forth in paragraph 8, and the custody arrangement between the
parties as set forth in paragraph 4 above, defendant should pay
to plaintiff as child support the sum of $619 per month,
commencing with the month of February, 1993, as shown on the
Child Support Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit

fl ff

A .

As a

further obligation of support, defendant should be responsible to
maintain the children on his currently-held health and accident
insurance which has a $500 deductible and each of the parties
should be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical
expenses incurred by any of the three children.
Defendant should have the further obligation to
pay to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which she
incurs which are work related.

Plaintiff shall provide to

defendant an accounting at the end of each month of the time and
cost of child care.

Defendant should then pay to plaintiff one-

half of said amount within ten days of receipt of the accounting.
The Court finds that Tony is currently in need of
therapy, and to the extent that expenses are incurred for
necessary therapy as that necessity is indicated by his

therapist, the cost of this therapy should be paid 70% by
11
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defendant and 30% by plaintiff.

This proration is roughly

equatable to the proration of income between the parties and,
further, takes into consideration the face that plaintiff should
have some substantial responsibility for the cost of therapy as
she has control of determining how often therapy is received.
The parties have stipulated that Sara should be
seen by a mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of once a
month and in the event of any opinion of the therapist that more
therapy is required, then as often as necessary, with each of the
parties to be responsible for one-half of the therapy.

The

choice of a mutually-acceptable therapist for Sara should be
determined by the parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein.
Any therapy for Sara with Michelle Miller should be paid by
defendant.

The division of this cost equally between the parties

is different than the division related to Tony's therapy for the
reason that defendant shall be responsible for all of the costs
of Michelle Miller, who is the current therapist for Sara.
Any obligation for payment of support or medical
or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the children are
minors and thereafter to high school graduation for any child who
turns 18 prior to graduation.
10.

Life Insurance.

So long cis he has an obligation

for the payment of child support, defendant should be ordered to
maintain a life insurance policy in the face amount of $250,000
naming either the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff's mother or a
12
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corporate fiduciary as the trustee for the benefit of the parties
three children.
11.

Alimony.

Based upon the findings which the Court

has previously set forth above and based upon the living expenses
of the parties as set forth in their respective exhibits,
defendant should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,000 a
month commencing with the month of February, 1993, and continuing
for a period of one year to allow plaintiff the opportunity to
reestablish her income based upon her demonstrated historical
earning capacity.

At that time, plaintiff should have the right

to petition the Court for a reevaluation to determine whether
alimony should be terminated at that time or extended based upon
the circumstances then existing.
12.

Restoration of maiden name.

Plaintiff has

requested and should be restored to her previous surname of Van
Siclen.
13.

Attorney's fees and costs.

Plaintiff proffered

evidence of attorneys1 fees which she had incurred with her prior
attorney Mary Corporon and with her present attorney Evelyn R.
Saunders and the Court having considered the reasonableness of
the fees and the relative ability of the parties to meet the cost
of attorney's fees and taking into consideration that defendant
shall be responsible for all his own fees, finds that it is
reasonable that defendant should be responsible for payment of
$3,000 to plaintiff for her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
13
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this action, which amount should be paid within 120 days from the
11th day of February, 1993, or upon sale of the house and real
property of the parties, whichever occurs first.
14.

Permanent restraining order.

Each of the parties

should be permanently restrained from in any way harassing,
threatening or harming the other.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from

defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which
Decree shall become final upon signing and entry.
2.

Custody and visitation is awarded as set forth in

paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact.
3.

The real property of the parties shall be sold and

divided as provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact.
4.

The personal property ot the parties is awarded as

provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact.
5.

The debts and obligations of the parties shall be

assumed and paid as provided in paragraph 7 of the Findings of
Fact.
6.

Plaintiff is awarded child support from defendant

as provided in paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact.

14
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7.

Defendant shall maintain life insurance for the

benefit of the minor children as provided in paragraph 10 of the
Findings of Fact.
8.

Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant as

provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact.
9.

Plaintiff is restored to her maiden name of Van

10.

Plaintiff is awarded attorneys1 fees and costs

Siclen.

from defendant in the amount of $3,000 to be paid as provided in
paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact.
11.

Each of the parties is permanently restrained from

in any way harassing, threatening or harming the other.
12.

Each of the parties is ordered to execute any

documents and cooperate in any way necessary to effectuate the
terms of the Decree of Divorce when it is entered.
DATED t h i s

A JSf-"day

of

$<1?UA

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDG1
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 1993, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW to:
Evelyn Saunders
401 Main Street
P. O. Box 3418
Park City, UT 84060
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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B. L. DART (818)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Defendant
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383

"EXHIBIT A"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
MARY COELHO,
:
Plaintiff,

:

CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET
(SPLIT CUSTODY)

v.

:

ALCIDES J. COELHO,

:

Civil No. 11093

:

Judge Young

Defendant.

oooOooo
I BASE AWARD CALCULATION
1.

Number of Children

2.

% Children w/each parent

MOTHER

FATHER

2

1

3

.67

.33

1,500.00

5,000.00

///// 1
///// 1
///// 1

Adjusted Monthly Gross

1,500.00

5,000.00

6,500.00

5.

Base Combined Child
Support from Tables

lllll

lllll

1,407.00

6.

Proportionate Share %

3a. Gross Monthly Income
3b. Pre-Existing Alimony
I 3c. Pre-Existing Support
1 4.

|| 7 .
8.

Parent' s Share Support $
Mother owes father

|| 9.

Father owes mother

0.23

0.77

323.61

1,083.39

106.79

lllll

lllll

125.81

10. Children's health
insurance premiums paid
|| 11.
12.

NET OBLIGATIONS
12 months (father to mother)

11111
11111

l
1

11111

1

0.00 1

Child care expense

13. BASE SUPPORT AWARD all
1

! COMBINED j

106.79

lllll

725.87
/////

/////

619.08

o.oo 1

1 14. CHILD CARE at 50%
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B. L. DART (818)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Defendant
310 South Main, Suite 13 3 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383

APR " 3 1993
Clerk of Summit County
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY

DepvtyOtk

STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
MARY COELHO,
Plaintiff,

:
:

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.

:

ALCIDES J. COELHO,

:

Case No. 11093

:

Judge Young

Defendant.

oooOooo
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on Thursday, the 11th day of February, 1993, at the hour of 9:00
a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Evelyn R,
Saunders, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney
B. L. Dart, and the plaintiff having testified and two
accountants having testified and defendant f s testimony having
been proffered and other matters were submitted by proffer and
the Court having received exhibits and the matter having been
submitted and the Court being fully advised and having made and
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
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1.

Decree and Grounds.

Each of the parties is

awarded a Decree of Divorce one from the other on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences, which shall become final upon signing
and entry.
2.

Custody and Visitation.

born as issue of this marriage:

Three children have been

Sara, born August 7, 1978, who

is 14 years of age; Tony, born August 19, 1980, who is 12 years
of age; and Emily, born September 29, 1986, who is six years of
age.

Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of Emily

and Tony, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation,
which shall be as follows:
a.

The right to have these two younger children,

each Monday evening from 5:00 p.m. to 8 Ip.m. for CCD and so long
as they are attending CCD.
b.

The right to have the two younger children

each Wednesday evening from 5:00 p.m. until Thursday morning and
then take them to school.
c.

The right to have the two younger children

each Saturday evening from 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
d.

The right to have all three children each

Christmas Day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
e.

All other major holidays to be alternated

between the parties.

B-20
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f.

During the summer school vacation period, the

visitation schedule shall change to alternating weekends and be
adjusted so that all three children are together each weekend.
g.

The right to be informed of and attend all

school activities, school performance and any extracurricular
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have
input into the important educational decisions of the children,
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the
right to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48
hours.
h.

The right to be informed of all school

activities, school performance and any extracurricular activities
where the children are performing and any emergency medical
health-care problems.
i.

Such other visitation upon which the parties

can mutually agree.
Custody of Sara is awarded to defendant subject to
plaintiff reasonable and liberal rights of visitation as follows:
a.

The right to have Sara Thursday evenings at

6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.
b.

The right to have Sara each Christmas Eve

from 5:00 p.m. to Christmas Day at 9:00 a.m.
c.

Major holidays to be alternated between the

parties.
3
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d.

Alternating weekends during the summer school

vacation period to coordinate with the two younger children so
that all three children are together each weekend.
e.

The right to be informed of and attend all

school activities, school performance and any extracurricular
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have
input into the important educational decisions of the children,
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and to
be informed of any non-emergency medical problems within 48
hours.
f.

Such other visitation upon which the parties

can mutually agree.
3.

Real Property.

The house and real property

located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, Utah, is ordered to be
listed for sale with a real estate agent mutually acceptable to
the parties, and a listing price to be arrived at between the
parties in consultation with said real estate agent.

Upon the

sale of said house and real property, and after payment of the
first mortgage obligation to Valley National Mortgage Co. which
has a current balance of $137,000, the second mortgage line-ofcredit to Valley Bank which have a current balance of $34,400,
expenses of sale and any out-of-pocket expenses of either party
necessary to place the home in marketable condition, and any
moving expenses of plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any
4
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remaining equity is ordered to be divided equally between the
parties.

An exception to out-of-pocket expenses would be that

any painting paid for by defendant shall be without reimbursement
up to the amount of $1,200.
a.

Plaintiff shall have an option for 30 days

from the 11th day of February, 1993, to retain said house and
real property upon payment to defendant of his equity in the
property which payment is ordered to be made within 3 0 days from
the time of the exercise of the option.

Defendant's equity shall

be established as one-half of the remaining amount after
deducting the first and second mortgage obligations from the sum
of $300,000, the appraised value of said house and real property.
Plaintiff's option shall be an exclusion from the listing of this
property so that in the exercise of this option, no real estate
commission will be incurred.
Plaintiff shall have the further option of
having the right of first refusal in the event of an offer by a
third party on the home upon the same terms as said third-party
offer so long as the amount received by defendant for his equity
is no less than the amount he would have received if a third
party offer had been accepted.
b.

Until such time as said house and real

property has been sold, plaintiff shall have the right of
exclusive occupancy and is ordered to be responsible for payment
of the first mortgage obligation.

The second mortgage

5
B-23

c\ o r> o

obligation

shall be paid one-half by each of the parties, and in the event
that either party pays more than one-half, then that party is
entitled to reimbursement of such excess of the other party's
share at the time of the sale of said house and real property.
c.

Each party is ordered to cooperate in any way

necessary to expedite and facilitate the sale of said house and
real property as the proceeds from the sale constitute the only
major asset of the parties and these proceeds will be necessary
to meet various liabilities of the parties for which no other
funds are immediately available.
d.

While it is in the best interests of the

children that they be allowed to stay in this home through the
end of the 1991-92 school year, if a sale of the home would be
lost by placing this as a condition of sale, the need of the
parties to sell this home shall take priority and preempt any
concerns which may exist for the children remaining in the home
for the duration of the school year.
4.

Personal Property.

The personal property of the

parties is awarded as follows, with the award to either party to
be free of any claim of the other:
a.

Each of the parties is awarded any items of

furniture and furnishings and persomil possessions currently in
his or her own possession except as otherwise expressly
hereinafter provided.
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b.

Each of the parties is ordered to make

available to the other party any photographs for the purpose of
allowing the other party to reproduce the photographs at his or
her own expense or to keep duplicate photographs.
c.

Defendant is awarded his personal property

currently located in the home occupied by plaintiff.
d.

Defendant is awarded his equipment and

personal property stored in the garage and under the tarp on the
property currently occupied by plaintiff.
e.

Plaintiff is awarded the smaller Fraughton

statuary and the larger Fraughton statuary is ordered to be
placed in the hands of an art dealer on consignment for sale and
with any net proceeds of sale to be divided between the parties.
f.

Defendant is awarded the 1984 Toyota 4-

runner.
Plaintiff is awarded the 1983 Toyota
Landcruiser.
h.

Plaintiff is awarded the horse trailer.

i.

Plaintiff is awarded the 1976 Ford truck.

j.

Plaintiff is awarded her horses and tack.

k.

Plaintiff is awarded the use of the

snowblower so long as she resides in the Park City area, but it
is ordered to be returned to defendant upon plaintiff moving from
the Park City area.

Defendant shall have the right to use the

7
B-25

BOUKOOflttE 8 5 7
0Q0355

snowblower to clear construction sites so long as his use does
not interfere with plaintiff's need.
1.

Defendant is awarded his stock in Coelho

Construction Company together with any liabilities.
m.

Plaintiff is awarded her premarital Kodak

n.

Plaintiff is awarded the Blue Cross/Blue

stock.

Shield health insurance premium refund and defendant is ordered
to provide whatever cooperation he can in obtaining a new
replacement check.
o.

Defendant is awarded the stock in New Classic

Development together with any liabilities.
p.

Defendant is awarded the parties 1 interest in

Solamere Partnership, together with any liabilities.
5.

Debts and obligations.

The liabilities of the

parties are ordered to be assumed and paid as follows:
a.

The first and second mortgages on the home at

5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, shall be assumed and paid as set
forth in paragraph 5 above.
b.

The 1992 income tax liability of the parties

is ordered to be divided equally between the parties, and the
parties are ordered to cooperate with their accountant, E. J.
Passey, in the preparation of income tax returns either jointly
or separately which will provide the lowest total tax liability.

8
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Defendant is ordered to be responsible for and pay for the cost
of this tax preparation.
c.

Defendant is ordered to be responsible for

any liabilities in connection with Coelho Construction Company,
New Classic Development and Solamere Partnership.
d.

Each party is ordered to be responsible for

the payment of any liabilities which he or she has individually
incurred since the separation of the parties in October, 1991.
6.

Child Support.

Consistent with the Child Support

Guidelines of the State of Utah, and based upon an income of
$5,000 attributed to the defendant and $1,500 attributed to the
plaintiff, and based upon the custody arrangement between the
parties as set forth in above, defendant is ordered to pay to
plaintiff as child support the sum of $619 per month, commencing
with the month of February, 1993.

As a further obligation of

support, defendant is ordered to be responsible to maintain the
children on his currently-held health and accident insurance
which has a $500 deductible and each of tne parties is ordered to
be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical expenses
incurred by any of the three children.
Defendant shall have the further obligation to pay
to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which she incurs
which are work related.

Plaintiff shall provide to defendant an

accounting at the end of each month of the time and cost of child
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care.

Defendant shall then pay to plaintiff one-half of said

amount within ten days of receipt of the accounting.
To the extent that expenses are incurred for
necessary therapy for the parties minor son, Tony, as that
necessity is indicated by his therapist, the cost of this therapy
is ordered to be paid 70% by defendant and 30% by plaintiff.
The parties daughter Sara shall be seen by a
mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of once a month and in
the event of any opinion of the therapist that more therapy is
required, then as often as necessary, with each of the parties to
be responsible for one-half of the therapy.

The choice of a

mutually-acceptable therapist for Sara shall be determined by the
parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein.

Any therapy for

Sara with Michelle Miller shall be paid by defendant.

The

division of this cost equally between the parties is different
than the division related to Tony's therapy for the reason that
defendant shall be responsible for all of the costs of Michelle
Miller, who is the current therapist for Sara.
Any obligation for payment of support or medical
or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the children are
minors and thereafter to high school graduation for any child who
turns 18 prior to graduation.
7.

Life Insurance.

So long as he has an obligation

for the payment of child support, defendant is ordered to
maintain a life insurance policy in the face amount of $250,000
10
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naming either the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff's mother or a
corporate fiduciary as the trustee for the benefit of the parties
three children.
8.

Alimony.

Based upon the present financial

circumstances of the parties, defendant is ordered to pay to
plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,000 a month commencing with
the month of February, 1993, and continuing for a period of one
year to allow plaintiff the opportunity to reestablish her income
based upon her demonstrated historical earning capacity.

At that

time, plaintiff shall have the right to petition the Court for a
reevaluation to determine whether alimony should be terminated at
that time or extended based upon the circumstances then existing.
9.

Restoration of maiden name.

Plaintiff is restored

to her previous surname of Van Siclen.
10.

Attorney's fees and costs.

Defendant is ordered

to pay $3,000 to plaintiff for her attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in this action, which amount is ordered to be paid
within 120 days from the 11th day of February, 1993, or upon sale
of the house and real property of the parties, whichever occurs
first.
11.

Permanent restraining order.

Each of the parties

is permanently restrained from in any way harassing, threatening
or harming the other.
12.

Mutual Cooperation.

Each of the parties is

ordered to execute any documents and cooperate in any way
11
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necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree of Divorce when
it is entered.
DATED this
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MAILING CERTIFICA1
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 1993, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to
Evelyn Saunders
401 Main Street
P. O. Box 3418
Park City, UT 84060
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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SO:

